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Anatomy of a Violent Protest Wave: Understanding the mechanisms of escalation and deescalation in far-right and anti-fascist street clashes
Leanne C. Serbulo
Portland State University, Portland OR USA
Abstract:
With the rise of right-wing populist ideologies and ensuing social polarization, political violence
has become more widespread. Between 2017 and 2019, far-right extremists and anti-fascists
engaged in more than twenty violent protest clashes in Portland, Oregon, USA. Through a
protest event analysis of those clashes supplemented with a case study of the protest wave, this
paper explores how the mechanisms of radicalization and de-radicalization operate when two
violent protest movements collide and interact with state security forces. The three-way
interaction among a movement, counter-movement, and the police can produce unanticipated
outcomes. For example, rather than de-escalating the situation, police underbidding resulted in
an increase in violence between the two movements. Understanding how the mechanisms of
radicalization and de-radicalization function in a movement/counter-movement protest cycle can
provide insight into the ways in which a movement’s strategy and their adversaries’ responses to
it can increase or decrease levels of violence.
Keywords:
Political violence, radicalization, anti-fascism, far-right extremism, movements/countermovements

A rowdy far-right crowd outfitted in helmets and tactical gear, many of them carrying
American flags on thick poles assemble in a red brick amphitheater in downtown Portland.
Across the street, monitored by a line of riot cops, hundreds of anti-fascists are gathered in an
old-fashioned town square including a sizable number of whom are masked and clad in all black
clothing. As the amphitheater crowd prepares to march, their leader smirks and shouts into his
bullhorn, “This is what the city of Portland wanted. They keep pushing and we’ll keep coming
back….” (Daniel V. Media)
The helmeted far-right protesters mass in the street heading towards the anti-fascists. The
anti-fascist crowd begins to file out to meet them. Shouting ensues; a far-right protester is heard
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screaming racial slurs; firecrackers are thrown, and the federal police guarding the amphitheater
start firing riot control munitions at the anti-fascist crowd who scatter to escape the barrage.
The anti-fascists reassemble and intercept the far-right march a few blocks away. When
the two groups meet, there is a momentary standoff, then a few protesters from each side lunge
towards one another. The first punch is thrown, and a brawl ensues. It’s chaos. People are on the
ground being kicked by multiple attackers, others are hit with flagpoles or collapsible batons,
bear and pepper spray are deployed. There’s no sign of the police.
This was the scene at one of the most violent street clashes in Portland Oregon where farright extremists fought anti-fascists at more than twenty protest events between 2017 and 2019.
This case study explores how the mechanisms that lead to an escalation or de-escalation of
violence operate when a radicalized protest movement and counter-movement collide and
interact with state security forces. In this case, both the far-right and anti-fascist movements
could be considered radical groups, because they were willing to engage in high-risk, direct
actions, including violence, that are not sanctioned by the state (Snow & Cross, 2011). In this
study, violence is defined as the use of physical force against a person. It does not include
property damage, which was not widely used by either side.
The adoption of violent tactics by movements in contemporary North America and
Europe occurs infrequently enough to make it a worthy topic of inquiry among social movement
researchers (Jackman, 2018). The research on collective violence usually focuses on the episodic
acts of violence that occasionally erupt during non-violent protests or on the emergence of armed
underground groups that engage exclusively in violence to achieve their aims. A relational
approach that analyzes the interactions between a movement, its adversaries, the political
conditions, and the broader public is particularly useful for studying both categories of collective
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violence, because the adoption of violence is socially emergent rather than ideologically-driven
(Tilly & Tarrow, 2007). Scholars of radicalization, which is the process of moving from nonviolence to a violent means of struggle, focus on the mechanisms, or the conditions and contexts
that drive movement factions to adopt violent tactics and to a lesser extent, on the mechanisms of
de-radicalization, or the environments that foster a rejection of violent tactics (Alimi et al.,
2015). Some of the key mechanisms that drive radicalization include: outbidding--tactical
escalation between a movement and its adversary, dissociation—the process of a movement
losing support or legitimacy from its base or the wider public, and upward spirals of political
opportunities--how a changing political context necessitates a change in tactics or approach. Deradicalization can occur when there are downward spirals of political opportunities--an
improvement in the movement’s standing among decision-makers, underbidding--de-escalation
between the movement and its adversaries, and a consensus mobilization--unity and agreement
on strategy or tactics among the various factions of a movement.
Many of the mechanisms of radicalization and de-radicalization identified in the literature
assume that a movement’s only adversary is the state. Mechanisms like outbidding and
dissociation may operate differently in movement/counter-movement situations. Exploring how
these mechanisms operate in a radicalized movement/counter-movement protest wave can
deepen our understanding of the conditions that facilitate and more importantly, prevent violence
from escalating further.
Political Violence and the Mechanisms of Radicalization
Collective violence is defined as an act by an organized group of people that is designed
to inflict harm in order to achieve a political goal (della Porta, 2013). While historically and
cross-culturally, movements have embraced a wide range of tactics including violence, social
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movement studies often treat collective violence as an anomaly, because most theorists focus on
mobilizations in European and North American democracies where the state has a monopoly on
violence and political structures are more responsive to calls for increased participation and the
expansion of rights (Jackman, 2018). In the 1970s, resource mobilization theory applied a
rational choice approach to understanding how movements operate (McCarthy & Zald, 1977).
Using this perspective, researchers examined why movements selected different tactics,
including those that are violent and disruptive. The use of violence and confrontation can make
sense, because these tactics are effective (Gamson, 1975, Piven & Cloward, 1977, Cress &
Snow, 2000). While the rational approach to understanding social movement activity opened-up
new avenues for exploration, the assumption that movement actors make tactical decisions based
upon a calculated analysis ignores important characteristics of activism. Movements are often
forced to respond spontaneously and make decisions “on the fly” (Snow & Moss, 2014). Shared
movement values and collective identities can shape the tactical decisions that are made in the
moment and can influence how movement participants frame and evaluate spontaneous tactical
responses, including violence (Snow et al., 1986; Polletta & Jasper, 2001).
Tactics do not emerge in a vacuum. They are dynamically produced as activists interact
with oppositional forces, changing political structures, and the broader public (McAdam et al.,
2001). Tactical innovations describe the novel protest methods that movements adopt in response
to repression from the state or counter-movements (McAdam, 1983). Tactical adaptations refers
to methods opponents use to counter these innovations and gain advantage.
Radicalization is the process of shifting away from more conventional non-violent tactics
towards violent struggle (della Porta, 2008, 2018). While the radicalization process unfolds
differently within each movement, some common mechanisms fuel the push towards violence.
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The contraction of political opportunities for making claims by more conventional means,
ideological competition among movement organizations, and escalating actions/counter-actions
between a movement and its adversaries can all push movement factions towards violence
(Alimi, 2011).
A few case studies explore the processes of non-radicalization, or the avoidance of
adopting violence, or de-radicalization, where the embrace of violent tactics is halted or reversed
(Weisburd & Lernau, 2006, Macklin & Busher, 2015, Alimi et al., 2015). Internal movement
factors, like the desire to participate in more mainstream politics or ruptures between the
collective identity of the movement and its use of violence can drive de-escalation. Additionally,
if popular or political support for a movement grows or security forces de-escalate their response
to a movement’s actions, violence can become less appealing to movement leaders or
participants.
Most of the literature on radicalization examines cases where a faction of a larger social
movement develops into a clandestine organization that uses political violence or terrorism to
achieve its aims. However, not all movements that adopt violent tactics develop into
underground armies. Macklin and Busher (2015) examined four eras of fascist/anti-fascist street
clashes in Britain, none of which spiraled into clandestine violence. De-radicalization was driven
by the movements’ desire to appeal to a broader public and take part in more mainstream
political activities. Leadership also played a role in controlling the violence as did activists’
values and collective identities. The far-right/anti-fascist protest cycle in Portland provides an
opportunity to further examine how the radicalization and de-radicalization mechanisms operate
during violent movement/counter-movement protest cycles.
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Portland’s Protest Cycle--Background
The Far-Right
Patriot Prayer, a Vancouver, Washington-based group, organized the far-right protest
events in Portland. Patriot Prayer was founded in 2017 by Joey Gibson who claimed to be
apolitical prior to Trump’s campaign (Matarrese & Dake, 2017). Angered by online videos of
violent scuffles outside a Trump rally in 2016, Gibson decided to go to the Republican National
Convention where he realized, “the left owned the streets.” The convicted felon and selfdescribed house flipper returned home from the convention and travelled around the West Coast
in late 2016 and early 2017 participating in far-right street brawls, which inspired him to
organize his own right-wing street movement based in S.W. Washington.
Although Gibson often cites his Japanese ancestry to refute charges that he is sympathetic
to racists and fascists, Patriot Prayer events regularly attract white supremacist and other far-right
groups. A former neo-Nazi described Patriot Prayer as a “convention center for white
supremacists,” and noted that the group holds “identical beliefs in different packaging.” (Olmos,
2020). While Gibson and Patriot Prayer may not directly espouse white supremacist rhetoric,
they act as political entrepreneurs by activating and accepting a hodge-podge of far-right
identities including those with racist ideologies (Tilly et al., 2017). Their rallies attract groups
that can be described as violence specialists including the Three Percenters militia and the Proud
Boys, an alt-lite hate group that act as frontline street brawlers.
The Anti-Fascists
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Portland had a strong anti-fascist direct-action youth
movement that successfully disrupted neo-Nazi organizing in the city (Treloar, 2004). Rose City
Antifa (RCA) was established in 2007 to combat a resurgence in white supremacist activity and
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is one of the foremost anti-fascist groups in the United States. RCA monitors and disrupts farright activity and organizing. They publish research articles exposing members of the far-right
and issue calls for community pressure campaigns to get extremists fired from their jobs or to
pressure venues to cancel extremist events. They also organize demonstrations to counter farright rallies. The Pacific Northwest Anti-Fascist Workers’ Collective (PNWAWC) plays a
similar role.
RCA and PNWAWC do not hold open meetings. Their members remain anonymous, and
most of their work occurs behind the scenes. When RCA hosts a counter-event, most of the
attendees are not RCA members. Anti-fascist events attract leftists from a variety of political
persuasions, although many identify as anarchists, socialists, or communists.
At various points in the protest cycle, more publicly organized, broad-based coalitions
formed to protest Patriot Prayer. Portland Stands United Against Hate was a short-lived,
mainstream left coalition that operated during the summer of 2017 and organized separate
counter-events from RCA. Labor Against Fascism, a small coalition of radical union activists cosponsored counter-protests with RCA throughout the cycle. In the summer of 2018, Popular
Mobilization (Pop Mob), a coalition of activists from labor, civil rights, arts, education, and
faith-based groups organized large-scale counter-protest events that employed creative tactics.
The Far-Right/Anti-Fascist Protest Cycle 2017-2019
The first major far-right event was held in an affluent suburb of Portland. Hundreds came
out to counter-protest, including a contingent of anti-fascists who tried to stop the far-right from
marching (Humphrey, 2017b). As in later events, the pro-Trump side included a number of
violent far-right groups from the Three Percenters militia to a Ku Klux Klan leader (Olmos,
2020). A similar march was held in Portland two months later, after leftist groups threatened to
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protest a parade, because the Republican Party had invited a hate group to march in their
contingent (Brown, 2017a). After the city cancelled the parade due to threats of disruptive
protest, Patriot Prayer held a march along the planned parade route. A number of far-right groups
and individuals were present at the March on 82nd Avenue, including Jeremy Christian who
arrived armed with a baseball bat. Christian hurled racist epithets at counter-protesters and gave
a Nazi salute. The police confiscated his bat, and he was asked to leave by some of members of
the pro-Trump contingent.
A few weeks later, Christian launched into a racist tirade on a MAX light rail train
targeting two young Black women, one of whom was wearing a hijab (Bernstein, 2017). Three
men surrounded Christian and asked him to leave the train. Christian stabbed the men killing two
and seriously injuring the third. Ignoring the city’s shock and grief, Patriot Prayer held another
protest, just days after the murders. The event again drew the far-right, but it also brought out a
thousand counter-protesters.
This pattern of far-right events and anti-fascist counter-events continued for more than
two years. Violence was a key feature of these protests, though the frequency of violent outbursts
and severity of the assaults varied from event to event. In addition to the organized events, the
two sides engaged in confrontations in other arenas. Far-right agitators harassed leftist and antiTrump demonstrators at a number of events including a city-sponsored immigrant and refugee
celebration. Meanwhile, anti-fascists doxed, or publicly exposed, far-right activists involved with
Patriot Prayer and launched community campaigns that resulted in extremists losing their jobs,
getting kicked out of local bars, and in venues cancelling their events.
By 2019, the far-right movement appeared to be waning. On May 1, 2019, Patriot Prayer
attacked a group of anti-fascists who were sitting on the patio a local bar. In the attack, a young,
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anti-fascist woman suffered a fractured vertebra (Zielinski, 2019). The police did not arrive until
long after the melee was over. A few weeks later, the owner of the bar filed a million-dollar
lawsuit against Joey Gibson and Patriot Prayer. In August, 2019, just days before a nationally
organized far-right event was scheduled to take place in Portland, the police issued warrants for
Gibson and five other men involved in the assault on the bar. While a handful of confrontations
have occurred since the arrests, there have been no organized, large-scale far-right protests and
anti-fascist counter-protests since August, 2019.1
Methodology
Protest event analysis is a social movement research method where protest data is
collected from newspaper and other media sources and coded for variables of interest to identify
patterns and cycles (Olzack, 1989). Although event histories have been used to trace
revolutionary processes over long spans of time, this method can also be applied on a smaller
scale to track localized protest waves of shorter durations. Newspapers are a flawed source for
event data, because of the inconsistencies in reporting on protests and inaccuracies in some of
that reportage, but media remains one of the most accessible sources for protest event researchers
(Hutter, 2019).
Although the far-right/anti-fascist clashes that occurred in Portland took place in multiple
venues from social media platforms to people’s homes to the streets, I chose to only chronicle
the twenty-one organized protest and counter-protest events. Data about these events were
readily available from local mainstream and alternative media sources, while accounts of
unorganized interactions and altercations were spotty. In addition, the protests were the visible
presence of these movements and shaped public opinion about them. To qualify as a protest
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event for this study, the event had to occur in the Portland metropolitan area and include an
organized event and counter-event.
Protest event data was collected from well-established mainstream and alternative
television, radio, and print media sources. While relying on news sources presents challenges,
issues of bias were mitigated by the multi-media content embedded in many of these reports.
Most stories about these events contained videos of the protest. For example, Oregon Live’s
coverage of the March on 82nd Avenue includes a reporter’s forty-minute live stream. Most
embedded videos are much shorter, but they capture the newsworthy aspects of the event,
including most of the violence. These video clips enabled me to see parts of these events live and
make my own judgements about issues that may be misrepresented or overlooked in the
reporting.
Protest events were coded for three main categories of variables: tactics, policing, and
mobilization. Tactical variables included the activities each group engaged in during the event
(i.e. marches, speak-outs), the type of gear they wore and weapons they brought, and the
frequency (number of incidents) and severity (level of injury) of violence at the event. Policing
variables included the strategies used to control the movements, the number of arrests, and the
severity (level of injury) of police violence. Mobilization variables included the number of
attendees at the event and the breadth of the coalition each side assembled. Once the raw data
was collected, indices were developed to measure the scale and intensity of each variable. The
results were analyzed to explore the relationships between variables and to identify patterns in
the protest cycle.
Since a protest event analysis only provides snapshots of a movement, an historical case
study was also conducted to chart the development of each movement, their interactions, and the
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city and public’s response to the violence. Case study data was collected from newspaper
sources, participant observations at public meetings, and review of archived text messages
between a Portland police liaison and the leader of Patriot Prayer.
Protest Event Analysis---Anatomy of a Violent Far-Right/Anti-Fascist Protest Cycle
Violence Levels and Policing
Figure 1 shows the levels of movement/counter-movement violence that occurred at each protest
event. The graph measures the frequency and severity of violent incidents (see Table 1).
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Violence Frequency Index

Violence Severity Index

Figure 1. Protest Event Violence Levels (Frequency and Severity)

Peak violence occurred during three events: the June 30, 2018 march described in the
introduction, the October 13, 2018 flash mob, and the May Day, 2019 bar attack. Each of these
events included sustained and widespread altercations that resulted in severe injuries. There was
a seasonal pattern to the violence. It escalated in the summer months, then fell during the fall and
winter. The events with the highest levels of violence had smaller numbers of attendees, and
some were hastily organized. The October 13, 2018 flash mob was called by Patriot Prayer in
response to an altercation between a motorist and protesters at a Black Lives Matter event. The
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Level
0
1

Violence Frequency Scale
None
Minimal—1-2 incidents involving a few protesters

2

Multiple incidents involving various individuals

3

Widespread violence involving majority of
protesters and lasting for significant time
Table 1. Violence Frequency and Severity Scales

Violence Severity Scale
No injuries
Minor injury with no lasting effect (i.e. pepper
spray)
Major injury not requiring medical attention
(i.e. visible bleeding or bruises)
Major injury with documented hospital visit

May 1, 2019 attack occurred after organized leftist May Day events and a small far-right
counter-event ended.
The least violent events were clustered in the early parts of the protest cycle. Three of the
four initial events had minor skirmishes or no violence at all (See Table 2). Two of the events
with the lowest levels of violence were held in the Portland suburbs, and some drew large
numbers of conservative activists that were not associated with far-right organizations. The
March for Trump (3/4/17) attracted many mainstream Republicans, and the March on 82nd
(4/29/17) drew conservatives who were upset by the cancellation of the annual parade. The antiabortion protest (1/19/19) included religious conservatives.
Events

Violence
Level
(Frequency
&
Severity)

Far-Right
attendance

Antifascist
attendance

Far-Right
coalition

Anti-fascist
coalition

FarRight
arrests

Antifascist
arrests

6
6
6

150
100
20

300
100
40

National
Regional
Local

Radical Left
Anti-fascists
Anti-fascists

2
0
0

2
0
0

0
0
0
1
0
0
0

3
3
14
0
0
0
0

Most Violent

6/30/ 2018
10/13/2018
5/1/2019
Least Violent

3/4/ 2017
1
200
1000
Regional
Broad Coalition
4/29/2017
0
200
50
Regional
Anti-fascists
6/4/2017
1
200
1000
National
Broad Coalition
10/8/2017
1
50
50
Local
Radical Left
11/13/2017
0
20
20
Regional
Anti-fascists
12/12/2017
1
50
25
Local
Anti-fascists
1/19/2019
1
40
100
Local
Radical Left
Table 2. Characteristics of the most violent and least violent protest events
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Figure 2 shows event violence levels with police violence factored in. When police
violence is incorporated into the analysis, violence peaks during the June 30, 2018 event and
remains elevated throughout the summers of 2018 and 2019 (See Table 3).
10
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7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Violence Frequency Index

Violence Severity Index

Police Violence Severity Index

Figure 2. Protest Event Violence Levels Including Police Violence

Police violence was not directed evenly at both groups. Anti-fascist protesters bore the brunt of
it. On June 4, 2017, police shot rubber bullets and stun grenades into the park where the RCA
counter-protest had assembled (Bivins & Brown, 2017). On August 4, 2018, police fired riot

June 4, 2017
Sept 10, 2017
June 30, 2018
August 4, 2018
August 17, 2019

FR attendees

AF Attendees

FR arrests

AF Arrests

200
120
150
400
300

1000
1000
300
1000
1000

0
1
2
0
0

14
9
2
4
13

Table 3. Events with high levels of police violence

control munitions into a large crowd of peaceful anti-fascists and multiple protesters were
seriously injured (Kavanaugh, 2018). With the exception of the June 30, 2018 event, all of the
protests that had large numbers of anti-fascist attendees were characterized by more severe
police violence
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Video footage of the protest events routinely show police officers lined-up facing
counter-demonstrators, their backs to the far-right extremists. Although arrests were not
widespread during the protest wave, anti-fascists were still arrested at much higher rates than the
far-right, even when accounting for their larger crowds. In total, 61 anti-fascists were arrested at
demonstrations, while only 8 far-right extremists were.
Tactics and Preparation for Violence
Despite the high-minded sounding names of their events (Freedom March, March for Free
Speech, or the March for Jesus), the purpose of far-right rallies was to instigate violence. Before
the first March 4 Trump event was held, far-right threatened to openly carry guns (Humphrey,
2017a). The far-right routinely signaled their intentions to engage in violence with the gear they
wore and the weapons they brought (See Figure 3). At the June 4th event that participants insisted
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Far-Right gear/weapons

Anti-Fascist gear/weapons

Figure 3. Protester preparation for violence (gear and weapons)

was about free speech, the far-right were decked out in protective gear and bulletproof vests and
carried sticks, knives and other weapons. With the exception of a few very early events and some
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of the smaller protests during the lull in the winter of 2017, far-right regularly attended these
events dressed for battle and armed with weapons (See Table 4.).
Scale
0
1
2
3

Gear Index
None
Bandanas, Masks, Face-Coverings
Helmets, fighting gloves
Tactical gear

4
Table 4. Gear and Weaponry Indices

Weaponry Index
None
Flagpoles, firecrackers, flares
Bear or pepper spray, mace
Knives, Tasers, batons, brass knuckles, hammers,
bats
Guns

In contrast, the anti-fascists were less visibly prepared to engage in violence at these
events. Anti-fascist protesters wore bandanas, masks, or other face coverings at every protest, but
were less likely to carry large sticks or other obvious visible weapons, especially during the early
part of the protest cycle. This may have been due to the increased police scrutiny of anti-fascist
protesters. Police were far more aggressive about seizing signs with sticks, flagpoles, and
homemade shields from anti-fascists protesters than they were about disarming far-right (Ryan,
2017).
Anti-fascist protesters’ lower intensity weaponry and gear also reflect their more
expansive tactical repertoire. At the March on 82nd, anti-fascists dressed in costumes, blew air
horns, and juggled (Campuzano, 2017). Throughout the protest cycle, anti-fascists sprayed silly
string, threw glitter, played instruments and drums, and dressed in banana costumes as part of a
“banana bloc.” However, over time, anti-fascists began to adopt the more militant gear that farright wore. The August 4, 2018 event was the first protest where sizable numbers of anti-fascist
protesters wore helmets. This rally followed the June 30th street brawl, where violence reached
peak levels for the first time. An anti-fascist protester suffered a skull fracture and traumatic
brain injury at that event, which may have prompted demonstrators to start wearing protective
head gear (Sheperd, 2018).
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The Impact of Violence on Mobilization
One measure of mobilization levels for both far-right protesters and anti-fascist counterprotesters was the types of coalitions the groups were able to assemble (See Table 5.) For the farright, their broadest coalitions drew activists from across the nation. For anti-fascists, coalitionbuilding entailed partnering with large numbers of organizations, especially those which had a
reach beyond the radical leftist milieu.
Scale

Far-Right Coalitions
1
Local (S.W. Washington and Oregon)
2
Pacific Northwest
3
National
Table 5. Mobilization Levels

Anti-fascist Coalitions
Anti-fascists
Anti-fascists and other Radical Leftist groups
Broad-based Coalition

Violence was a key mobilizing tool for far-right protesters. Organizers were able to
assemble national coalitions when violence at preceding protest events had escalated or reached
peak levels (See Figure 4.) National far-right groups responded to calls to travel to Portland to
RWE coalition

Total Violence Index

4
3
2
1
0

Figure 4. Impact of Violence on Far-Right Mobilization

punish anti-fascists who had injured or humiliated Patriot Prayer in the prior protest event.
At the June 30th protest, busloads of Proud Boys travelled from around the nation to take revenge
on Portland anti-fascists who had chased and thrown rocks and bottles at the Patriot Prayer as
they were leaving the previous march (Wilson, 2018a).
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Far-right mobilization was also boosted by recent extremist attacks. Just a little over a
week after the MAX murders, Patriot Prayer held their first rally that drew a national audience.
The August 4, 2018 rally drew a national crowd after footage from the June 30, 2018 brawl went
viral, and far-right media outlets heralded the Proud Boy who fractured an anti-fascist protester’s
skull (SPLC, 2018).
Many of the same events that catalyzed far-right were also mobilizing for anti-fascists,
but for different reasons. High-profile far-right attacks and murders outraged community
members. The MAX murders shocked the city and helped mobilize the first broad-based
coalition on June 4, 2017. The coalition included faith-based groups, a wide array of labor
organizations, civil rights groups, radical leftists, and committed anti-fascists. A similar
coalition came together in response to Patriot Prayer’s September 10. 2017 event, which
occurred just weeks after the deadly Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. In the
latter half of the protest cycle, the outsized rhetoric by far-right inspired the creation of Pop Mob,
a broad-based coalition that used creative tactics to confront far-right. Pop Mob’s first counterprotest was organized in opposition to the August 4, 2018 far-right protest, which was preceded
by intense violent rhetoric. While threats of violence and online chatter about guns and other
weapons were a common feature of the far-right build-up to their rallies, the rhetoric surrounding
the August 4, 2018 event was particularly violent. The Southern Poverty Law Center (2018), a
group that monitors the far-right activity, warned that the event could become “another
Charlottesville.”
Discussion and Conclusions
Outbidding, or the escalation of tactics in response to the increased use of force or by an
adversary, is one of the mechanisms that facilitates radicalization within a movement (della
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Porta, 2013, Alimi et al., 2015). Conversely, radicalization can be slowed down or reversed if
underbidding occurs, which is when security forces or other adversaries deescalate a conflict by
responding with reduced force. The outbidding/underbidding processes usually involve
movements and state security forces. In the far-right/antifascist protest wave, the outbidding and
underbidding processes were complicated by the three-way interactions between the movement,
counter-movement, and the police producing some unexpected outcomes that deviated from the
patterns identified in the radicalization literature
Throughout 2017 and much of 2018, Portland police monitored the smaller far-right/antifascist events at a distance, but refused to intervene between the two sides even when fights
broke out. The police insisted that the protesters were engaged in “mutual combat” and therefore,
could not be arrested for assaults (Sheperd, 2019). While the concept of “mutual combat” exists
under Oregon law, it applies to organized fights, not assaults that occur during street clashes.
Lieutenant Jeffrey Niiya, who would later come under investigation for his extensive text
message exchanges with Patriot Prayer, perpetuated this false application of the “mutual combat”
exceptions in Oregon law among the far-right leadership and within the Portland Police Rapid
Response protest unit (Portland Police Bureau). The systematic failure of the police to intervene
in the early part of the cycle allowed outbidding to occur between the far-right and anti-fascists.
Violent altercations escalated during the summer of 2017 and 2018, which made the violence
much more difficult to control and de-escalate later on.
The police were not exclusively hands-off during these events. They took a more
aggressive approach at all of the large protests that attracted significant numbers of anti-fascists.
At the June 4, 2017 and September 10, 2017 events, anti-fascists greatly outnumbered the farright demonstrators. On June 4th, the police fired stun grenades and rubber bullets into the park
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where anti-fascists were gathered, while the far-right crowd was left alone (Bivins & Brown,
2017). While the police arrested any anti-fascists, who tried to enter the park where the far-right
was gathered that day, they allowed right-wing protesters wearing body armor and armed with
large sticks to repeatedly push through anti-fascist crowds.
Portland police were hostile towards anti-fascists, because they equated them with
militant black-bloc protesters and anarchists. Black-bloc is a tactic where protesters dress in
similar black clothing, cover their faces, and march together in a group. It provides anonymity,
so individual protesters can engage in militant actions then blend back in with the larger group.
Although black-bloc is a protest tactic, anti-fascism is a political stance, and anarchism is an
ideology, they are often conflated. Police associate black-bloc protesters with property damage,
violence, and animosity towards police.
The police felt justified in using pre-emptive force against non-violent gatherings with
black-blocs, because they believed these protests have the potential to become riots. In
November, 2016 after Trump was elected, large-scale protests erupted in Portland. Thousands
marched and the police remained hands-off, until one night, a handful of masked demonstrators
damaged property and rioted (Domonoske, 2016). After the anti-Trump riot, the police preemptively engaged in hard repression tactics against any protest that included a black bloc.
Police fixation on anti-fascists demonstrators caused them to downplay more serious
threats by right wing extremists. On August 4, 2018, police fired flash bang grenades and rubber
bullets into a large crowd of peaceful anti-fascist protesters causing multiple, serious injuries.
Months after the August 4th protest, the city revealed that during that event, police had
discovered that far-right extremists armed with loaded rifles had set-up a post on the roof of a
parking garage overlooking the anti-fascist crowd (Friedman, 2018). Despite this alarming
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discovery, police still considered the anti-fascist crowd a threat that afternoon, and the armed farright contingent was not arrested.
The overwhelming police presence at the largest events demonstrates the authorities’ fear
of anti-fascist protesters. Police were brought-in from other agencies to assist and lines were setup to separate the far-right from anti-fascist counter-protesters, which helped prevent violence.
All of the large-scale protests had relatively low levels of movement/counter-movement
violence. However, the benefits of violence reduction were not experienced equally by both
sides. Anti-fascists continued to deal with violence, although it was perpetrated by the police,
while the far-right were largely protected from violence as a result of large police presence. In
this case, both underbidding, where the police took a hands-off approach, and outbidding, where
hard repression was used, led to increased violence against anti-fascists, while outbidding
benefitted the far-right side, because the heavy and aggressive police presence protected them
from anti-fascist violence.
Dissociation is another mechanism that can lead to an escalation or de-escalation of
violence between two groups (Alimi et al., 2015). Dissociation describes the process by which a
movement becomes estranged from its supporters or potential supporters. Engaging in violence
can lead to a loss of support or legitimacy. The battle for public legitimacy is not only waged by
movements. The authorities must also consider how their response to a movement will be
perceived by the public (King, 2017). If the police response to protesters is seen as too
aggressive, the movement could gain sympathy or support, and the public may become more
critical of the authorities. Similarly, if the authorities can de-legitimize a movement, the public
might tolerate repression against it. As with the outbidding mechanism, the process of
dissociation becomes more complex when it entails a movement, counter-movement, and the
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state. Dissociation is further complicated by the multiple audiences that movements engage with.
Movements can gain or lose their hardcore base, but they can also alienate a broader swath of
potential supporters.
The hands-off policing strategies legitimized far-right violence within the Patriot Prayer
base and led to the hardening of the political identities of far-right activists and their
sympathizers (Tilly et al., 2017). Assaulting anti-fascists in front of the police without
repercussion reinforced the far-right narrative that leftist protesters were a threat that needed to
be eliminated and that the state was supportive of this position. In the build-up to the August 4,
2018 event, a far-right activist from Texas told supporters that police had given Patriot Prayer a
“green light” to gather in Portland and physically defeat anti-fascists, and that failure to do so
there would mean the threat would “spill over” into their hometowns. (SPLC, 2018).
Likewise, the repression that anti-fascists experienced did not lead to dissociation from
their base. For anti-fascists, many of whom have strong anti-authoritarian tendencies, the lack of
police response to protest violence confirmed their belief that you cannot rely upon the state to
combat the far-right. Anti-fascists believe the far-right poses an existential threat to multicultural
democracy and the state is complicit in fueling far-right movements. When the police routinely
failed to arrest far-right brawlers and attacked anti-fascist protesters, this hardened anti-fascist
attitudes about the state and bolstered their belief in community self-defense, which means using
all tactics at their disposal including violence to disrupt far-right organizing and prevent attacks
(Mesh & Pein, 2017).
While the hands-off policing strategy hardened the political identities of both the far-right
and the anti-fascists’ supporters, it initially led to a dissociation between both groups and the
wider public. News reports and comments from 2017 reflect the public’s dismissive attitude
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towards both groups as they repeatedly engaged in “dumb clashes” (Brown, 2017b). As the
altercations persisted, escalating far-right rhetoric led to further dissociation between Patriot
Prayer and the residents of Portland.
The frenzied rhetoric that preceded many of the far-right protests glorified violence
against the left. In the weeks before the August 4, 2018 event, far-right extremists from around
the country were threatening to bring “thirty guys or more with AR-15s” and calling the next
rally “a true war.” (SPLC, 2018) Patriot Prayer rally attendees didn’t just threaten anti-fascists,
they demonized the entire city, including the mayor and police force who were hardly
sympathetic to local anti-fascist protesters (Wilson, 2018b). The vitriolic social media posts and
threats aimed at Portlanders from out-of-town far-right supporters galvanized the city’s residents
and produced a backlash that helped mobilize a broader anti-fascist coalition. As the far-right
became further dissociated from the wider public, anti-fascists and their approach to opposing
Patriot Prayer gained more sympathy and legitimacy.
Anti-fascists were able to incorporate new activists into their coalition, because their
movement embraced a more expansive tactical repertoire that emphasized creativity without
renouncing militancy. Anti-fascist demonstrators who were not comfortable engaging in violence
could participate in a wide variety of actions away from the front lines. The decentralized
organizational structure of the anti-fascist movement facilitated this diversity of tactics by
empowering affinity groups to come-up with their own protest actions. The August 17, 2019
event featured a Buddhist meditation and a Shabbat service, a costume-making station, dance
performances, giant unicorns, impromptu marches, and a banana costumed band (Wilson, 2019).
During that event, masked anti-fascists also physically defended the crowd from an attack by
hammer-wielding far-right extremists who drove an armored-plated bus. By late 2018, the
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process of consensus mobilization had emerged (Alimi et al., 2015). Consensus mobilization is a
de-radicalization mechanism where various factions within a movement work in concert with
one another within agreed-upon parameters, rather than competing against one another for
tactical or ideological superiority, which can lead to factionalism and further radicalization.
The anti-fascist movement did not renounce violence in order to broaden its coalition.
Violence remained an important part of the anti-fascist repertoire. Affinity groups and
participants associated with the Pop Mob coalition would often “thank the bloc” for protecting
the crowd. Pop Mob promoted the idea of everyday antifascism where ordinary Portlanders
could counter the far-right by engaging in whatever tactic they felt comfortable using from
organizing supply drives for homeless shelters to punching militia members.
In addition to the outbidding and dissociation mechanisms, radicalization can be
facilitated or discouraged by changes in the political environment. Downward spirals of political
opportunities refers to the improvement of a movement’s standing among those in power, while
upward spirals of political opportunities describes the changes in the environment that weaken
the movement’s platform or invalidate some of its tactics (Alimi et al., 2015). Downward spirals
can lead to de-escalation, and upward spirals may fuel radicalization.
While anti-fascists were targeted by the local authorities throughout the protest cycle, by
the summer of 2019, there were some significant shifts in the political environment. The rhetoric
in the lead-up to the far-right’s August 17, 2019 event got so heated and volatile that Federal
Bureau of Investigation visited one of the two out-of-state organizers (Bernstein, 2019). The
overheated rhetoric and repeated attacks against the city by the far-right, conservative press,
Republican politicians, and President Donald Trump galvanized community members and city
officials who had otherwise not been sympathetic to militant anti-fascists or their tactics. For the
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first time during the entire protest wave, city officials took a proactive stand holding a public
press conference to denounce the far-right who had been demonizing the city and hosting
repeated violent protests for over two years. A few days before the event, the police arrested six
Patriot Prayer members including Joey Gibson on felony charges for their violent May Day
attack on anti-fascists.
This study examined how the mechanisms of radicalization and de-radicalization can
produce unexpected outcomes when movements interact with more than one adversary. For antifascists, both outbidding and underbidding by the authorities resulted in increased violence,
while the far-right benefitted from increased police repression. Rather than deescalating the
situation, underbidding by the police led to an increase in movement/counter-movement
violence. While both groups maintained their hardcore supporters throughout the protest wave,
the rhetoric that kept the far-right’s base engaged caused the movement to become dissociated
from the wider public and produced a backlash that led to increased sympathy for the anti-fascist
movement. Anti-fascists were able to incorporate new members into their movement with their
more expansive protest repertoire. In the latter half of the cycle, anti-fascists achieved a
consensus mobilization that embraced a diversity of tactics including militancy and violence.
The growing movement of everyday anti-fascists placed pressure on the city. This eventually led
to a downward spiral of political opportunities where politicians publicly renounced the far-right,
and the authorities arrested those who perpetrated the May Day attack. This slight shift in the
political environment coupled with the fortitude of the anti-fascist movement that steadfastly
resisted two years of attacks by the far-right and the police was enough to stop the violent protest
cycle.
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While more analysis needs to be done to determine if these mechanisms persist in other
contexts, understanding how radicalization and de-radicalization occur in situations that involve
movements, counter-movements, and state is particularly relevant given the rise of far-right
movements in Europe and North America and the subsequent growth in anti-fascist organizations
dedicated to combatting them. Inevitably, the violent ideologies of the far-right will lead to a
violent response. Political violence has measurable direct and indirect impacts on the
communities where it occurs. During these two years of street clashes in Portland, dozens were
injured, significant public resources were spent, and some of the city’s most vulnerable residents
were subject to a climate of pervasive fear.
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The Ku Klux Klan leader who attended the first far-right event in 2017 announced that he would hold a rally on
February 8, 2020 in downtown Portland. A large anti-fascist group assembled to counter-protest, but the Klansman
never showed-up.
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